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This paper explores how collective social norms can have individual-level genetic foundation. 
Our study is the first we know to report a plausible link between genetically founded individual 
preferences in a fraction of a population and social norms governing behavior of all individuals. 
As our motivating example, we focus on patterns of Excessive Drinking in Social Situations 
(EDSS) across Europe that are possibly triggered by genetically caused variations in personality. 
The genetic trait is shyness, which correlates with eye color. We present empirical results 
indicating that alcohol consumption in social situations correlate with eye color and a model 
which suggests that conditions exist in which EDSS can emerge as a strategy in a larger fraction 
of the population than is genetically predisposed to EDSS. In addition, our model shows that 
alcohol taxes may be counter-productive in controlling the emergence of EDSS as a social norm.  
 1.  Introduction 
This paper explores how social norms can have a direct and indirect genetic 
foundation.  Our model is the first we know to report a plausible link between 
genetically founded individual preferences in a fraction of a population and social 
norms governing behavior of all people.  Our results show that conditions exist in 
which one particular social norm—binge drinking, or excessive drinking in social 
situations (EDSS)—emerges as a coping strategy in a larger fraction of the 
population than is genetically predisposed to binge drinking. The extent that this 
social norm emerges depends crucially on the fraction of genetically predisposed 
people in a population. When this fraction exceeds a threshold determined by 
economic, social and genetic factors, all people, shy or not, binge drink.  A key 
implication of this result is that social norms may have a genetic causation, and 
that these norms can affect the behavior of people who do not share the genes 
that cause the behavior.  In addition, our model suggests that increasing alcohol 
taxes to control the emergence of EDSS could be counter-productive—less total 
consumption, but more binge drinking. 
Our paper is related to the emerging economic literature focusing on 
neuroscience to explain both behavior and preferences (see Camerer et al., 2003 
for a general overview). This approach seems pertinent when examining 
preferences for addictive substances as substances chemically affecting the 
production and functioning of neuro-transmitters form these preferences. 
Bernheim and Rangel (2004), for instance, study individual decision making by 
explicitly recognizing how dopamine may lead to cue-dependent preferences for 
alcohol consumption, and how such a process could cause and sustain alcoholism. 
Our study differs from theirs in several respects. They are concerned with 
alcoholism and individual choice, along the line of Becker and Murphy (1988).  
 1Our study is concerned with EDSS,
1 and the effects of the neuro-chemical 
agent norepinephrine. Norepinephrine is strongly associated with the 
physiological manifestation of anxiety and relevant for shyness; whereas 
dopamine plays a role in the brain’s perception of present and future pleasure 
derived from consumption. Furthermore, we focus on alcohol and neurochemistry 
in a social context with interacting people, whereas Bernheim and Rangel focus 
on individual decision-making. This does not mean that they disregarded social 
context; rather they consider how a person chooses an environment from a set of 
possible environments each with different implications for alcohol preferences. 
This set, however, is exogenous.  In our model, the environment changes in 
response to changes in the aggregate of individual behavior.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We first provide background on our 
motivating example of excessive drinking in social situations, focusing on Europe.  
We also evaluate alternative explanations for the emergence of EDSS that differ 
from our model.  In the third section, we present the model and the main results.   
Section 4 extends the model to allow a person to exit a social situation when he 
does not like the level of drinking. The fifth section considers how a policy to 
increase the price of alcohol affects binge drinking. Finally, we offer our 
concluding remarks. 
                                     
1 While a link exists between EDSS and alcoholism, many people engage in EDSS over a number 
of years or even a lifetime without ever becoming alcoholics. The theory of rational addiction is of 
less relevance to the present paper than may seem apparent. There is no alcoholism in the present 
model. We only model drinking behaviour in a social context. The theory of rational addiction 
works on the premise that the benefits gained today from drinking to e.g. forget bad memories or 
overcome shyness matter more to alcoholics than tomorrow’s costs such as hangover or their 
future visits to the hospital for kidney or pancreas treatments. For these drinkers, the dynamic 
aspects of their behavior are important. The theory presumes, however, that people understand 
the physiological effects of alcohol and make cost-benefit judgments accordingly. This 
presumption has been contested, e.g. Gerena (2003). The physiological effects of alcohol 
consumption examined in our paper could be seen as subtler than those driving alcoholism and 
are therefore not assumed to affect individual decision-making. 
 22.  Motivating Example:  European Alcohol Use  
A comprehensive study by Leifman (2002) confirms the mind-set that significant 
differences actually exist in drinking patterns across Northern and Southern 
Europe. The study finds that although the frequency of alcohol consumption 
occasions and average annual consumption figures are lower in the Nordic 
countries, excessive drinking in social situations (EDSS) is more predominant in 
northern Europe than in the South.
2 Leifman finds that 46.7% of Finnish males 
and 34.8% of Swedish males engage in heavy drinking at least once a month but 
not more often than once a week.
3 The corresponding number for Italian males is 
16.2%. Further, average alcohol consumption of beer or spirits per drinking 
occasion can, depending on drinker age, be more than 4 times as high in Sweden 
and Finland than in Italy. 
We now present our argument in five steps to explain how genetic variations 
translate into frequent EDSS in northern Europe.  First, in a comprehensive 
study of shyness, Kagan (1994) found an active norepinephrine system, 
originating in the part of the brain called amygdale, to be highly correlated with 
shyness. Remarkably, Kagan also observed a correlation between an active 
norepinephrine system and several external physiological characteristics, the most 
prominent being blue eyes and tall ectomorphic bodies. The association between 
blue eyes and shyness has been replicated by among others Reznick et al. (1989) 
and Coplan et al. (1998).
4 Coplan et al. found that 30 percent of blue-eyed males 
in an unselected sample of preschoolers fell into the category ‘socially wary’ 
                                     
2 Leifmann also finds signs of a convergence in drinking patterns between southern and northern 
Europe and suggests that this may be caused by increased cultural interaction.  
3 We do not include the small number of people who engage in heavy drinking more than once a 
week to exclude alcoholics. 
4 As noted in Reznick et al. (1989) and Coplan et al. (1998), a considerable number of studies 
have examined the link between pigmentation and personality reported here. The overwhelming 
majority have found support for this link (see the references sited therein).  
 3whereas only three percent of the males without blue eyes did.
5 These 
physiological features are more common in northern European countries than in 
the south. This suggests that one may reasonably expect that shyness is more 
common among people of northern Europeans decent than southern Europeans. 
Schwartz et al. (2003) observed that the shy individuals in an earlier study by 
Kagan had a tendency to remain shy; and this shyness continued to manifest 
itself in the amygdala. This point matters for our purposes since it indicates that 
observed variations in shyness among children will partially continue into the age 
when alcohol consumption starts. This correlation between pigmentation and 
personality is also found in other animals. It is well known among animal 
breeders that selecting for pigmentation often implies selecting for personality 
traits and vice versa. Although the literature suggest both biochemical and 
evolutionary explanations for the link between shyness and eye color, a strong 
correlation between eye color and personality is sufficient for the argument. Even 
if the correlation may be caused by pure coincidence, the point remains that 
people of northern European background will have a higher propensity for a shy 
personality. See below for an evolutionary explanation suggested by Kagan. 
Second, several coping strategies exist for shyness in social situations. The 
classic strategy is to use alcohol as self-medication, which can lead to excessive 
drinking, i.e., EDSS.  Many studies confirm this view. See, for example, Carrigan 
and Randall (2003) who review the social phobics literature and Thomas et al. 
(2003) who examine the case of socially anxious people.
 6   
                                     
5 To the extent that studies have included gender, the literature suggests that the link between 
eye color and personality is much stronger in males than females, e.g., Coplan et al. (1998). Most 
of these studies considered North Americans of similar background, which should to some extent 
control for cultural influences. 
6 Studies from medical and psychology literature also report mixed results in the effectiveness of 
self-medication. The suggestion that self-medication has mixed results does not imply non-
optimality in the economic sense. Alcohol as self-medication is the optimal strategy given the 
prices of alternative coping strategies.  We are concerned with the idea that people use this 
 4Third, given the first two steps, it follows a larger fraction of the 
population in northern Europe should have a greater genetic disposition for 
EDSS.  We examine the validity of this step by conducting a short survey in 
which we asked alcohol consumers about their motivation for drinking and 
compared the answers for individuals of different eye colors. The results of this 
survey are that blue eyed individuals were more likely to report that they 
consume alcohol to feel more relaxed in social situations and that they were more 
mindful of peers’ alcohol consumption level when fixing their own. The details of 
the survey are given in the Appendix. 
Fourth, if the fraction of the population with EDSS genetic disposition is 
sufficiently large, social reinforcement mechanisms could come into play. People 
frequently adapt to the behavior of others, see Banerjee (1992). If EDSS is 
atypical, it is considered anti-social. If EDSS is relatively common, it has a 
“legitimizing” effect and EDSS becomes socially acceptable.  
Fifth, if steps 1-4 hold, we should observe a larger fraction of the 
population that engages in EDSS in northern Europe than in southern Europe. 
Our social norm hypothesis is that EDSS emerges as a strategy in a larger 
fraction of the population than the fraction genetically predisposed to EDSS.  
Our model takes the higher frequency of shyness among northern 
Europeans as a given, without explaining why. Kagan, for instance, suggests 
northern Europeans have an active norepinephrine system due to the cold 
climate.  In a cold climate, there is a fitness gain to physiological adaptations 
that encourage high metabolic rates. One such adaptation is an active 
norepinephrine system caused by neuro-chemical processes in the amygdala which  
appears to have changes in pigmentation as a side effect. An alternative 
                                                                                                             
strategy with the expectation that it will work; see Kushner et al. (2000). Also remember we are 
concerned with EDSS, not alcoholism. Although a relationship between shyness and alcoholism 
has been reported, the relationship is not straightforward, Lépine and Pélissolo (1998), and not 
addressed herein.  
 5explanation is that light eye pigmentation is the result of sexual selection 
processes, see Frost (2006). These explanations suggest that an evolutionary 
genetic selection process explains why blue eyes are more common in northern 
Europe. Furthermore, shyness in itself is not the trait selected for, but rather a 
side effect to the advantageous trait. We do not incorporate the evolution of the 
shyness and eye color in the model as the cause of shyness is not required to get 
our results. Rather we take it as given that evolution has resulted in blue eyes 
being common in Northern Europe and that this has had the effect that shyness 
is more common in the North than in the South. Nor do we incorporate the role 
of alcohol in the evolution of eye color/shyness as this evolution may precede the 
human manufacturing of alcohol.  
Several studies have related shyness to genetic factors; even down to 
reporting correlations with specific variants of genes (see Arbelle et al., 2003). 
The correlation between shyness and external physiological features also seems to 
indicate that genetics at least plays a part. A link between personality and 
pigmentation has been reported in certain animals, strengthening the argument 
for a genetic link in humans. Perhaps the best known example is Belyaev and 
Trut (1975) who found that in breeding for specific types of behavior one also 
selected for white fur as well as other physiological traits. 
Alternative explanations for these observed variations in European 
drinking behaviour have been proposed:  climate, culture and the effect of alcohol 
prices.  We here consider each in turn, and argue that the rationales for these 
alternative stories are less compelling than our own.   
First, does climate have a direct effect on drinking behaviour in that cold 
weather induces a preference for drinking?  The basic idea is that alcohol gives 
the consumer a perception of feeling warm. There are several problems with this 
idea. The perhaps most important is that if excessive drinking is caused by the 
desire to feel warm one would expect that Northern Europeans engaged in 
relatively more drinking in everyday situations than people in warmer climates 
and that drinking would be concentrated in winter time. As documented by 
 6Leifmann, however, Scandinavians drink less in everyday situations. Further, 
with the exception of drinking associated with Christmas celebrations, winter is 
not marked by particularly high consumption. The opposite seems to be the case, 
Lie Røhr (2006).
7 It has also been suggested that Seasonal Affective Disorder may 
induce excessive drinking in social situations. This is an interesting hypothesis, 
but it is not supported by the facts. First, although EDSS is more frequent in 
some (but not all) of the northern US states; these states are located at the same 
latitude as Southern Continental Europe where EDSS is historically not a big 
issue. Further, if Seasonal Affective Disorder or cold for that matter induces 
EDSS, one would expect behaviour in Alaska to exhibit EDSS.  Among US states 
Alaska, however, only ranks as 25 with respect to overall binge drinking, below 
states like Texas and New Mexico (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, 2004).  
Second, are the observed drinking patterns side effects of other cultural 
variations across the European continent?  Perhaps, but not likely.  For instance 
people note a casual link between religion and drinking patterns—EDSS is less 
common in catholic countries and more in protestant countries. Although this 
holds for the most part, there are some interesting exceptions such as Ireland and 
Catholic parts of Scotland. The Church of England is also traditionally similar to 
the Catholic Church and cannot be called protestant in the sense of, say, 
Lutheranism.  And although Germany as a whole is intermediate with respect to 
binge drinking, there seems to be a tradition for some binge drinking in the 
Catholic south (October fest.) Further, recent experience in Catholic Spain where 
binge drinking amongst teens and young adults appears to be a growing 
phenomenon suggests the role of religion is limited, whereas the effect of being 
exposed to peers from Northern Europe is considerable (Gual and Colom, 1997). 
                                     
7 From our personal experience, most Scandinavians do not drink alcohol to stay warm. Drinking 
alcohol when it is cold makes you feel even colder. The real remedy against cold weather is to 
dress in layers, use a hat, sturdy footwear and abide by sensible building codes. If you must drink 
something to keep warm, drink hot cocoa. 
 7Some have argued a liberal alcohol culture itself is conducive to a lack of 
binge drinking culture.  Those countries lacking policies for reduction of alcohol 
consumption are those in which there is little evidence of EDSS. We do, however, 
believe this argument turns causality on its head.  EDSS is a problem that 
creates externalities and it is in countries with a history of EDSS in which 
policies are in place. As a counter example, Denmark is permissive with relatively 
low alcohol prices and legal drinking age and a distinct culture for EDSS.
8 
Finally, do high prices cause people to lump consumption into short bursts 
of excessive drinking interspaced by long periods of abstinence? There are 
different ways of examining this question. One can examine a conventional model 
of an atomistic utility maximising consumer with alcohol consumption as an 
argument in an intertemporal utility function. Such a model yields such a price 
response only under peculiar assumptions about the preference ordering. 
However, if one recognizes that social drinking patterns evolve in a social context 
a price increase may have exactly this effect, e.g., if drinking occasions are 
organized as parties in which a host provides alcohol. It seems reasonable that 
hosts will arrange fewer parties if alcohol prices increase. We show below that in 
such a social context EDSS is more likely to evolve at higher price levels. 
 
 
                                     
8 One possible criticism of our work is that EDSS appears in many cultures in the world; some 
where blue eyes are not present in the population. However, when examining these cultures one 
may actually find support for our findings. The studies supporting more shyness among blue eyed 
individuals all compare Caucasians, presumably mostly people of European decent. In other 
studies where East Asian children have been compared to Caucasian children, East Asian children 
have been found to be more socially inhibited. As it is shyness/social inhibition in a fraction of 
the population that leads to EDSS emerging as social norm, finding binge drinking in East Asian 
cultures can be interpreted as supporting evidence for our work. It does appear that binge 
drinking does play a considerable role in both Korean and Japanese culture.  
 83.  A Model of individual genetics and Social Norm Formation 
Now consider our model of how social interaction between people in a group leads 
to the formation of a social norm for excessive drinking. We begin our analysis 
under the assumption all individuals participate in social situations. This 
assumption is helpful when developing the dynamics of the model. We then relax 
this presumption by allowing some people the choice to exit from a social 
situation if their drinking behavior is too removed from the social norm. This 
adds realism to the model and gives rise to qualitative predictions that seem to 
explain regional differences in drinking patterns. 
Suppose two types of people exist (type 1 and 2).  The types are distinguished by 
the level of alcohol consumption that provides a “comfortable” level of 
intoxication in social situations, as measured by blood alcohol content (BAC). 
Type 1 drinkers are comfortable with a BAC of α; type 2 drinkers prefers α + 
f(α).   Think of α as the physical “comfort” level of intoxication, and f(α) as the 
extra “buzz” required by a shy person to be comfortable in a social situation. Our 
modeling of how alcohol consumption reduces shyness is consistent with the dose-
related effect of alcohol on reducing stress; see e.g. Sher and Walitzer (1986).
9     
Assume   < 0, i.e., if α is large, f(α) is small. This assumption reflects the 
idea that if a shy person is comfortable with a high BAC, his need for an extra 
“buzz“ to cope with the social situation is relatively small.  It is assumed that 
there is an upper level of α given by R, such that f(α) = 0 for all α > R. R has 
the interpretation that if α = R, then the comfort level of alcohol is so high that 
() f ′ α
                                     
9 Sher and Walitzer (1986) reports reduced stress as a function of alcohol intake in a social 
situation both measured by heart beat rate and by individual self-reporting. This study only looks 
at relatively low levels of alcohol blood levels. (< 0.850 g/Kg). Other studies have found 
significant stress reduction measured by reduced heart beat rate only at higher levels, Sher and 
Levenson (1983). The main point for our purposes is that stress in social situations is a decreasing 
function of blood alcohol content.  
 9if the individual consumes R there is no need for additional consumption to 
reduce the shyness effect.  
Normalize the number of drinkers to unity, such that n is the non-shy fraction of 
the population of type 1 and (1 – n) is the shy fraction of type 2. Both types 
have preferences for conformity in that they do not want to be perceived as 
different from the norm. This preference translates into a desire to not deviate 
from the drinking norm, here taken to be the average drinking levels, denoted σ. 
A parameterization of these preferences is: 
  , (1)  () ( ) ( ) 2 Uc c z c = −− − γ− σ 2
where z is α1 for type 1 and [α2 + f(α2)] for type 2 drinkers.  Let γ > 0, measure 
of the desire for conformity with the crowd. The value of γ can reflect a desire to 
“be like the others” through real or perceived peer pressure. The peer pressure 
may be positive as in Bernheim (1994) or negative as in Akerlof (1980).  Pressure 
can also reflect positive mutual externalities in conformity caused by something 
as prosaic as the belief it is less fun to be sober while others are not and vice 
versa. If γ = 0, a drinker does not care about conforming,  if γ > 0, a drinker 
pays attention to the average level of intoxication.
10 Some empirical justification 
for a positive value of γ is given in the appendix. Denote ci, i = 1,2, as the 
optimal alcohol consumption of type i.  Think of the model as a large population 
in which people continuously mixed with new people. The alcohol consumption 
levels that maximize utility as a function of αi and σ are given by: 





α + α + γσ α + γσ
==
+ γ + γ
 (2) 
                                     
10Assume no one is a role model, and alcohol consumption levels are determined without strategic 
considerations and that inter-temporal strategic considerations do not affect the outcome. Alcohol 
price is excluded in our analysis. Although we recognize and appreciate that alcohol prices are 
important in any person’s decision problem, we suppress price effects to focus on the interaction 
between personality and consumption (see Becker, Grossman and Murphy, 1991).  
 10By definition, σ = nc1 + (1 – n)c2, so in equilibrium σ is determined by: 




α + α + γσ α + γσ
σ =+ −
+ γ + γ
 (3) 
Solving Equation (3) with respect to σ, yields the equilibrium value of average 
alcohol intoxication. 
  ( ) ( ) () 12 11 nn n f σ = α + −α + −α
2  (4) 
Inserting for σ into (2) gives the equilibrium level of intoxication for the two 
types: 
 






γ− α + α + γα
=+
+ γ + γ
2  (5) 
 






+ γ− α + α γα
=+
+ γ + γ
2  (6) 
From Equation (5) we see the preference for conformity affects intoxication levels 
for both types of drinkers.  Type 1s drink more than their comfort level,  , and 
Type 2s drink less than their preferred level 
α
1
( ) 2 f α + α
2
,
.  If f(α2) is sufficiently 
large, this can translate into a considerable increase in average alcohol 
consumption per person in social situations.  
We have so far assumed α1 and α2 + f(α2) constant. But the “feel-good” level of 
intoxication, αi, responds to values of ci consistently above or below αi, NIAAA 
(2000). This adaptation occurs on a neuro-chemical level and is the reason why 
heavy drinkers exhibit high tolerance for alcohol. Preferences are adaptive as in 
von Weizsäcker (1971). We model this adaptation, which is physiological in 
nature, by assuming α1 and α2 are determined by the following differential 
equations. 
   , αα α ii i i Fc hM i = −− = b g b g 12  (7) 
 11where  M is a physiologically determined upper bound for αi. No drinker can 
achieve a comfort level of drinking when αi > M. Assume F(0) = h(0) = 0. 
Furthermore, let  ′ ⋅ () F > 0 and h(M – αi) > 0 for all αi < M.   
We now have all the pieces to model the dynamic interaction of people who 
engage in repeated social intercourse involving drinking.
11 When analyzing the 
problem, we distinguish between two cases: M  and M . If M , two 
steady states exist. If M , one steady state exists.  In both cases, there is 
only one stable steady state, which is given by α1 = α2 =
R > R < R >
R <
[ ] min , MR =m. We 
restrict our analysis to the set [0, m]×[0, m]. 
Figure 1 illustrates a phase diagram for possible time path of α1 and α2, in which 
we illustrate three paths, a, b and k.  In Figure 1, we see every path in the state-
space defined by [0, m]×[0, m] terminates in the one steady state, point SS. Note 
that lines   and   cannot intercept except at the point SS. This is a 
striking result.  If m = M, everyone, in the long run, adapts to a level of 
intoxication that is the maximum physical level at which it is possible to be 
comfortable. If m =R, the shy fraction of the population adapts to the level in 
which the shyness effect disappears, and the rest of the population also adapts to 
this level. In the long run for both cases, the shyness effect implies that in long-

1 0 α = 
2 0 α =
                                     
11 This dynamic aspect leads to the introduction of a dynamic element, and raises the possibility 
of modelling the consumers’ decision problem as a dynamic optimisation problem. The most 
important reason for suppressing this is that such an optimisation problem does not seem 
credible. It is worthwhile to point out again that we are not modelling alcoholism. The changes in 
α are changes in the comfort level. To illustrate, consider an individual that goes to a sequence of 
parties. A person starts with a comfort level of alcohol equivalent to 2 glasses of wine. At parties, 
however, he or she consistently drinks 4 glasses. After a number of parties the comfort level 
adapts with build-up of tolerance modelled by the differential equation in (7) and the comfort 
level increases. Although this is a process that all drinkers experience to some extent, it strains 
credulity to think that this effect is part of the calculation when the person decides on how many 
glasses of wine to drink at a given drinking occasion. 
 12run equilibrium non-shy population mimics the drinking habits of shy people (i.e., 
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Figure 1, Phase diagram for α1 and α2 
Now assume α1 = α2 = α, where α is some common low initial comfort level. 
Figure 2 illustrates the development of c1 and c2 when (α1, α2) starts from point 
b in Figure 1. We see c2 starts out at a higher level than c1. This is the initial 
shyness effect. Then c1 and c2 increases at an initially faster rate than c1, which is 
caused by feedback from the effect of c on α. Because c2(0) > c1(0), α2 initially 
increases more rapidly than α1. This is caused by the “bulge” towards the α2 –
                                     
12 In contrast, if no shyness effect exists (e.g. if n = 1 or β = 0) or there is no preference for 
conformity (γ = 0), we know any initial level of α1 represents a steady state and consumption for 
the non-shy fraction of the population remains at this level.   
 13axis in the path starting in point b in Figure 1. Faster growth in α2 than α1 
initially feedbacks into higher growth rates in c2 than c1. As α2 approaches its 








Figure 2. Alcohol consumption time paths 
 
4.  Norm Formation given Exit 
In our model, EDSS emerges as a norm regardless of the strength of the shyness 
effect and the magnitude of the fraction of shy individuals. This result is robust 
with respect to functional forms with the model. As long as shyness affects 
drinking patterns in such a way that shy individuals has higher consumption 
                                     
13 Our model shares features with Conlisk’s (2003) dynamic preference model. In particular, our 
result that preferences are harmonized over time is consistent with Conlisk’s results. 
 14than non-shy individuals, EDSS emerges as a social norm. This result holds when 
shy and non-shy individuals treat one another symmetrically as peers and both 
participate in social situations. The joint effects of symmetric peer pressure and 
the physiological buildup of tolerance when drinking exceeds the comfort level 
ensure that shy individuals drink a little bit more than non-shy and non-shy 
individuals play catch-up. Symmetric peer pressure and participation, however, 
may be too strong assumptions. People may treat other individuals 
asymmetrically. If the number of individuals engaging in EDSS is small, they 
may be stigmatized rather than having the ability to influence drinking behavior 
in others. Introducing stigmatization could possibly reverse the finding that 
EDSS emerges regardless of the magnitude of f(·) and n.  We examine a different 
mechanism that makes the emergence of EDSS depends on n. Consider the case 
in which people can exit from the social situation, i.e., too much drinking might 
cause non-shy people to leave a party; too little might cause shy people to stay 
home.
14  We model exit by providing shy people an outside option, e.g., staying 
home on Saturday to watch TV.
15  Assume exercising this option gives utility, –
A. The shy person’s maximization problem is:  
   (8)  () () () () (
2
2 2
22 2 2 max max ,
c cf c
⎡⎤
−− α + α− γ − σ − ⎢⎥
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ) A
Inserting σ and c2 from (4) and (6) into (9), we derive values for (α1, α2, n) that 
makes a shy person indifferent between the social activity and exiting: 
  ( ) 12 ,, , 0 nA φα α =  (9) 
                                     
14 We do not incorporate exit as an option for Type 1 since it seems empirically irrelevant. 
15 We do not specify the behaviour of shy people after they exit social situations. Assume their 
behaviour outside the social context does not affect people who remain on the social scene. 
 15If   > 0, shy people participate; otherwise, they exit.
16 Figure 3 
illustrates the condition in (α1, α2) space. For given values of n and A, the value 
of α1 that makes a shy person indifferent is a concave function of α2.   
( 12 ,, , nA φα α )
)
)
Recall at any instant in time, α1 and α2 determine c1 and c2.  If (α1, α2) lies 
above the curve  , shy people exit.
17  The dynamics of α1 and α2 
depend on whether   falls below or above 
( 12 ,, , 0 nA φα α =
() () ( 12 , tt αα ( ) 12 ,, , 0 nA φ αα = .  
1
2
Shy individuals engage in social activity
Shy individuals do not engage in social activity
 
Figure 3, Participation constraint for shy individuals. 
                                     
)
16 To simplify, assume if φ = 0, shy people do not participate. 
17 We draw the curve   in Figure 3 such that the curve intersects the α1 – axis 
for a positive value of α1. This is not always the case.  For sufficiently large values of A, the cost 
of exiting is too large and shy people participate for any value of α1. This implies the curve 
intersects the α1 axis with a positive value of α1. In contrast, if A = 0, for all sufficiently low 
values of α1, shy people exit and the curve intersects the α2 axis.  
( 12 ,, , 0 nA φαα =
 16 
To illustrate how exit affects behavior, assume α1 = α2 = α (as point b in Figure 
1). If   is above φ,   traces a path similar to b in Figure 
1. If   is below φ, shy people exit. Non-shy people still socialize, 
without the pressure to conform since all the relatively heavy drinkers are gone. 
This can be modeled as setting σ = σ1 in the optimization problem in (1). The 
solution to maximizing utility in (1) and finding the equilibrium is then that 
Non-shy people all choose c1 = α1. Below the curve, the dynamics of α1 is: 
() () ( 12 , tt αα ) )
)
() () ( 12 , tt αα
() () ( 12 , tt αα
   αα α 11 1 1 0 = −− = Fc hM b g b g  (10) 
If   crosses φ, this implies a discrete jump in alcohol consumption for 
both groups. If   crosses the φ from above, alcohol consumption in 
both groups has a discrete jump downwards and vice versa.   




() () ( 12 , tt αα
Given exit, consider the comparative static on how the fraction of non-shy people 
(n) affects the formation of drinking norms.  In Figure 4Figure 3, the thick line 
from origin to the point SS references the benchmark no-exit path of 
 for a starting point close to origin.  There are four lines illustrating 
the φ-curve for different values of n. The figure is drawn so n1 < n* < n2 < n3. 
The curve   corresponds to the case with the largest fraction of 
shy people; 
() () ( 12 , tt αα
( 12 3 ,, , 0 nA φα α =




min , M  
  
1








Figure 4. The dynamics of α1  and α2  for different values of n 
 
Consider first the largest fraction of shy people,  ( ) 12 3 ,, , 0 nA φ αα = . Since 
 lies below the φ-curve, shy people never enter social situations. 
Non-shy people have no pressure to conform, and consume c1  = α1. It follows 
that   = 0.  This we dub the sober/temperate society.
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() () ( 12 0, 0 αα )
)
                                    

1 α
Second, consider the smallest fraction of shy people (n = n1). Here we see the 
path of    lies in its entirety above the path 0-SS.   
proceeds along the path towards SS, and is identical to the no-exit path—the 
binge society.  
() () ( 12 , tt αα () () () 12 , tt αα
 
)
18 If   had values of α larger than point d in  , this implies a path towards 
SS. But this result could only occur if circumstances outside the model forced   
there. The historical role of alcohol as an extremely efficient medium to store calories could 
possibly have brought this about in some societies. 
() () (
12 0, 0 αα Figure 4
() () ()
12 0, 0 αα
 18Third, the intermediate case (n = n2) reveals an interesting pattern. Here shy 
people do not exit immediately.  But since α1 and c1 grows slower than α2 and c2, 
shy people acquire drinking habits that diverge from non-shy people. After an 
initial period,   reaches point a, and shy people then exit. Non-shy 
people remain and without incentive to adapt to non-shy drinking habits, they 
reduce their alcohol consumption,   = 0—the tipsy society, since we see a small 
increase in alcohol consumption among non-shy people.  
() () ( 12 , tt αα )
                                    

2 α
Finally, consider the threshold case, n = n*.  For n < n*, alcohol consumption 
approaches a steady state with excessive drinking (point SS). For n ≥ n*, there 
are moderate or no increases in the long run steady state drinking levels among 
non-shy people. Figure 5 shows the relationship between n and steady state 
values of α1.
19 
It may be thought that our results are counterfactual. Our model explains the 
variations in drinking patterns by predicting that EDSS does not emerge in some 
cultures because shy individuals exit from social situations and choose to, say, 
stay at home and watch television. This is not typical in say the Mediterranean 
culture. But this is exactly the point. Because this behavior is rare it does not fit 
the stereotypical image of an Italian or Spaniard. And because it is rare, these 




19 We do not shown the relationship between n and steady state values of α2, because we have 
left unspecified the drinking behaviour of shy people if they exit. 
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Figure 5.  Relationship between n and steady state values of α1. 
 
5.  Prospects for Policy: Increasing Alcohol Prices 
An open question is how our findings affect optimal alcohol policy. The model 
allows us to explore how alcohol prices affect the likelihood of EDSS emerging as 
a social norm. There is a large variety of social situations in which alcohol is 
consumed. For each such situation a set of demand conditions may be derived. 
Individual drinking behavior may vary from situations where each individual 
bears the purchasing cost of alcohol and situations where a host bears the entire 
cost. Here we consider two different possibilities: (1) fixed alcohol quantity, 
variable number of drinking occasions, or parties; and (2) variable alcohol 
quantity; fixed parties.    
5.1  Fixed alcohol quantity/variable frequency of parties; 
A reduction in the frequency of social drinking situations would be expected to 
affect the shape of  . Let τ1 and τ2 be two different frequencies such that τ1 >  i α 
 20τ2. Thus τ2 corresponds to the frequency with a higher alcohol price. Write 
 to indicate the differential equation for αI, 
conditional on τ. We already assumed     = 0. If 
consumption in social situations is equal to the comfort level, the comfort level 
does not change. If c is higher than αI, assume for a given level of c, it holds 
() ( ) ,1 ii i i Fc h M i τ α = −α −α =  , 2
) i α =  () ( 0 i Fh M τ −α
( ) ( )
1 i Fy h M τ −α  >  ( ) ( )
2 i Fy h M τ −α . For a level of c higher than α, higher 
drinking frequency implies higher rate of adaptation. If it is assumed   is a 
continuous function of c, it can be shown that there is an interval (α, α + ξ) 
such that following holds. If y1 > y0, then 
i α 
( ) ( )
1 1 i Fy h M τ −α  –  ( ) ( )
2 1 i Fy h M τ −α  
>  ( ) ( )
1 0 i Fy h M τ −α – ( ) ( )
2 0 i Fyh M τ −α . This can be proven formally. The basic 
idea is intuitive and is illustrated in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6, Effect of changes in drinking frequency on the rate of change in α 
 
We illustrate with two levels of c above a given level of α. Think of the low level, 
c1, as the level of a non-shy individual,  adapting consumption levels to a 
 21population with several shy individuals with high consumption. The high level, 
c2, is the level of a shy individual. If both c1 and c2 lies in the interval (α, α + ξ), 
the reduction in α is largest for the shy individual. The existence of such an 
interval with the discussed properties is assured. This is the case regardless of 
whether   is concave or convex in the interval. However, if c1 and/or c2 were large 
enough to lie outside this interval, the conclusion could be reversed. It has not 
been possible to derive functional forms from the literature. 

Let us now examine the impact of higher taxes/lower frequency on the 
development of drinking patterns. Consider the curve from the origin to SS in 
Figure 1.  Think of this curve as function that gives α1 as a function of α2. The 






α  =  12 αα  . If 
τ increases from τ1 to τ2, it is straightforward to see the path from the origin 
towards the steady state shifts as illustrated in Figure 7. But these paths are 
drawn conditional on no exit from social situations. Now assume the participation 
constraint is given by the curve marked φ(⋅). In this case, if alcohol prices are 
low, (α1,  α2) converges towards ( )
**
12 , αα , at which point shy individuals exit. 
( )
**
12 , αα  is a point of the type we call a tipsy society. There is some increase in αi 
relative to the starting point.  
Alternatively, if prices are high, the path lies above the participation constraint 
and the society converges towards the state SS with a fully-fledged binge culture. 
This result seems counterintuitive as it implies that if prices increase, the 
likelihood of a bingeing culture emerging increases.  Conversely, if prices are low, 
alcohol consumption in social situations is likely to be low.  The explanation for 
this result is the lower drinking frequency when prices are high implies that 
consumption by shy drinkers does not increase too fast relative to non-shy 
drinkers. Non-shy drinkers and shy drinkers have consumption patterns that 
move closer together. This reduces the likelihood that shy people exit.  But if shy 
people do not exit, the culture is on a path towards a bingeing culture. The 
higher the price, the slower this path converges towards ss; and the smaller the 
























Figure 7, Development of drinking patterns for different drinking frequencies. 
 
5.2  Variable alcohol quantity at social situations/fixed frequency of parties 
We model this by assuming utility from drinking in social situation is given by: 
   (11)  () ( ) ( )
22 ,1 , ii ii i Uc c z c p c i = −− − γ− σ − = 2 .
 23Here p is the relative price of alcohol measured in appropriate units. With this 
specification of utility, it is straightforward to calculate the equilibrium response 
to changes in p for consumers of type 1 and 2 and find that is negative.
20 If p is 
large enough, no alcohol consumption occurs. We omit analysis of this case and 
focus on the case where maximization of (11) results in positive values of c1 and 
c2. (Note that this is consumption conditional on participation in drinking 
situations. Below we examine the case where ci = 0 due to withdrawal from 
drinking situations.) For our purposes we want to examine the effect of p on  , i 




Figure 8, Effect of changes in drinking frequency on the rate of change in α 
 
The consumption for shy people is reduced from c(α2,  p0) to c(α2,  p1) and 
consumption for non-shy individuals is reduced from c(α1, p0) to c(α1, p1). The 
                                     
20 With these parameters, the derivative of equilibrium values of c1 and c2 with respect to p is ½. 
 24result is that the reduction in   is larger than the reduction in  . Note the 
reduction in c caused by changes in price may be short a short run effect. If   
remains positive, then ci increases over time as consumption adapts to changes in 
the comfort level. 
2 α  1 α 
i α 
 
Having the price as an argument in the objective function, however, also implies 
the participation constraint shifts. It is a straightforward exercise to show an 
increase in prices shifts the participation constraint so for every value of α2, the 
value of α1 required to maintain Type 2 individuals in social situations increases. 


















Figure 9, The effect of prices on long run equilibria. 
  
 25Here the path labeled p = p0 is the path of (α1,  α2) when prices are “low,” 
conditional on no exit and the path p = p1 is the path of (α1, α2) when prices are 
“high,” conditional on no exit. The shift is due to changes in   resulting from 
reduced consumption. The curve Φ(p0) illustrates the participation constraint for 
the low price. Two possible curves are drawn for the participation constraints 
when  p = p1. The curve labeled ΦS(p1) shows the shift when participation 
sensitivity to price changes is small. The curve ΦL(p1) shows the participation 
constraint when sensitivity is large. Assume the social group’s initial comfort 
levels imply α1 = α2 = 0, but that some regulator fears the emergence of an 
EDSS norm. The regulator has to choose between the high and the low price. 
From Figure 9, we see the low price results in the point A emerging as the long 
run equilibrium. The long run equilibrium with the high price depends on the 
price sensitivity of the participation constraint. If price sensitivity is low, the 
shift in the participation constraint is not large enough to offset the shift in 
(α1(t), α2(t)) and an EDSS emerges. If the price sensitivity is high, then (α1(t), 
α2(t)) converges to the point B. The path with a high price does not converge 
towards ss, but still implies higher steady state values of αi, and therefore also ci, 
than the equilibrium, A, with a low price.  
i α 
5.3  The Effect of Prices Summed Up 
We find an unexpected ambiguity in the effectiveness of using price instruments 
as a policy tool for restraining consumption—increasing prices may increase the 
likelihood of EDSS emerging as a norm. This result is consistent with the 
empirical literature on the relationship between price and alcohol consumption, 
see Chaloupka et al. (2002) for an excellent review.  Increasing prices leads to: (1) 
lower frequency of consumption occasions, (2) short-term reduction in 
consumption per drinking occasion, and (3) reduced likelihood of participation in 
alcohol consumption occasions. These effects are the same as we have used or 
derived in the model. Our results still indicate that these effects may increase the 
probability of an EDSS norm emerging in the long run.  The effects of these three 
different factors, however, are not equally robust.  
 26First, the frequency effect is robust with respect to choice of functional forms. 
Reduced drinking frequency through increased prices leads to increased likelihood 
of EDSS except under unrealistic assumptions. Second, in the present model the 
effect of short-term reduced consumption per occasions increases the likelihood of 
an EDSS. This effect is not entirely robust as alternative specifications of the 
utility function may lead to a reduced likelihood of EDSS emerging. This could, 
however, only happen if an increase in prices brings about a substantially larger 
reduction in consumption among shy individuals than non-shy individuals.
21 
Third, in our model the shift in the participation constraint has the unambiguous 
effect of reducing the likelihood of an EDSS. We have, however, only drawn a 
participation constraint for Type 2 individuals. If we also included a participation 
constraint for Type 1 individuals, one could see that they may exit before Type 2 
individuals. In this case, their exit leads to a more rapid path towards EDSS. 
Which types exit first depends crucially on the distribution of the two types. The 
effect via the participation constraint can therefore also imply that higher prices 
lead to the emergence of EDSS.  
Which of these effects dominate depends on the social organization of drinking 
culture. If drinking culture is dominated by occasions in which a host bears the 
cost of alcohol consumption, it is reasonable to expect an increase in price will 
reduce frequency rather than participation and short-term consumption per 
occasion. In this case, a price increase unambiguously increases the likelihood of 
EDSS. If the price of alcohol is borne by each individual consumer, the picture is 
less clear. To some extent the social organization of drinking culture is probably 
                                     
21  In  , both types reduce their consumption by the same amount. This is an artefact of 
quadratic utility; quadratic utility implies the effect of prices on c is symmetric, i.e., the reduction 
is the same for both types. It can be shown, however, that non-zero third derivatives may imply 
one type reduces consumption more than the other. If Type 1 individuals’ price elasticity is 
sufficiently higher than Type 2’s, then   may be reduced more than   and this shifts the 
(α1(t), α1(t))- curve south east except at the origin and ss. 
Figure 8
1 α  2 α 
 27endogenous and responds to changes in prices, which is a topic for future 
research. 
It may seem paradoxical that even if prices reduce all three factors (frequency, 
consumption, and participation), a norm with high consumption per drinking 
occasion may become more likely. But this behavior is exactly the pattern that 
has emerged in Europe, where frequency of drinking occasions and total alcohol 
consumption is far lower in the north than in the south, but where consumption 
per occasion is much higher. The fact that EDSS has emerged in spite of 
extraordinary efforts of raising the real price of alcohol through high taxes and 
reduced availability lends credence to our conclusions. At a minimum, our model 
provides a plausible rationale for why prices have been relatively unsuccessful in 
reducing EDSS in Northern Europe.   
 
6.  Concluding remarks  
If genes are responsible for geographical variations in shyness, our results have 
some intriguing implications. First, our model suggests variations in the 
frequency of certain genes may explain geographical variations in individual 
behavioral as adaptation to genetic baggage. Second, these adaptations may 
aggregate into social norms and provide a genetic explanation for variations in 
social phenomena. Third, the social norm is only loosely connected to the trait 
that has an advantage in an evolutionary selection process. In this perspective it 
is somewhat ironic that southern Europeans attribute the EDSS behavior in 
northern Europe to “living in a cold climate.” The argument is living in the cold 
makes people drink too much.  If Kagan is correct in his hypothesis of how a high 
frequency of shy individuals in northern Europe has evolved, this may, in a 
roundabout sort of way, be supportable.  It is an open question whether the 
emergence of EDSS in itself provides some evolutionary advantage. At a first 
glance the answer appears to be “no” since mortality risk arises with EDSS. 
Alternatively, the short-term gains from applying a social lubricant that 
promotes interaction between people in a population with many shy individuals 
 28may outweigh the long-term costs of mortality risk on both a social and a 
personal level. This remains to be established in future work. 
A possible test of the relevance of the model would be if similar EDSS patterns 
emerged in other areas of the world where blue eyes are common. Data from the 
US suggest that EDSS patterns in the US follow the same blue-eye gradient as 
Europe. The 5 US states with the highest prevalence of binge drinking are in 
order: North Dakota, Wisconsin, South Dakota, Minnesota, and Montana, 
(Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2004).  These are 
also the states with the highest fractions of the population of Scandinavian 
ancestry (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004). States with smaller but significant 
population fractions of Scandinavian ancestry such as Iowa and Nebraska also 
have high prevalence of binge drinking, (8th) and (9th). The only exception 
appears to be Washington State where 6.2 percent of the population is of 
Norwegian ancestry, but ranks as 44th with respect to the prevalence of binge 
drinking. It is interesting to note that states such as Idaho and Wyoming which 
could be expected to be similar to Montana and the Dakotas but have few people 
of Scandinavian ancestry rank lower with respect to the prevalence of binge 
drinking. Wyoming is 14th and Idaho 43rd, suggesting that a high frequency of 
Scandinavians could be of some importance in explaining the observed patterns.  
One possible explanation for the high prevalence of binge drinking in states with 
a large fraction of people of Scandinavian decent is that immigrants to these 
regions brought their drinking culture with them. This appears not to be the 
case. Scandinavian migrants to the Northern Midwest were, or became, very 
religious, Smith (1978). A strong temperance movement emerged. Local 
temperance societies started to appear in towns across the US in the mid 1800s.  
The Independent Order of Good Templars, for example was founded in 1852.    
According to the Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan (2005), 
"[t]he Good Templars lodges were very successful in recruiting Scandinavian 
immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and many lodges 
operated for years in the native tongues of the immigrants."  North Dakota was 
among the first states to prohibit the sale of alcohol (in 1889).  Returning 
 29migrants often formed the backbone of similar movements in Norway (also see 
e.g., Zahl and Andrews (2003) who stress how Norwegian immigrants to 
Minnesota promoted temperance in public policy and social services.)  It seems 
likely that the Scandinavian communities that emerged in the second half of the 
19th century did not tolerate binge drinking, and the current binge drinking 
patterns must have emerged later. This anecdotal evidence suggests that binge 
drinking in states with a large Scandinavian population emerged independently as 
a social norm, which does not contradict our hypothesis that genetic factors are 
the cause of the observed EDSS patterns. Further collaboration for the possibility 
that blue eyes may code for social behavior that may translate into excessive 
drinking is that Basset and Dabbs (2001) in two different samples found that 
prison inmates with blue eyes had a higher propensity for a history with high 
alcohol consumption than brown-eyed inmates. 
A confounding factor we have not addressed here is how gender relations affect 
the formation of drinking habits. As previously noted, Coplan et al. (1998) found 
that the shyness/eye color correlation was only significant in males. It is a 
straightforward exercise to generalize the findings herein to a model in which 
males and females only partially consider each other peers. 
In conclusion, we show by example how geographical variations in the 
distribution of personality may be compounded by social reinforcement 
mechanisms to affect behavior of all individuals in a social group. The example 
we study is variations in drinking patterns in social situations. Our findings have 
implications on several levels.  To the best of knowledge, our study is the first to 
report a plausible link between genetically founded individual preferences and 
social norms governing behavior of all individuals. Further, we show this link is 
not smooth but may exhibit threshold effects. Finally, we have identified several 
intriguing counterintuitive results on pricing strategies that policymakers might 
find useful to consider as they further extend alcohol policy in individual 
European countries and in their attempts to create an integrated policy for the 
European Union. We find conditions under which a policy promoting increased 
alcohol prices could backfire—higher prices increases the likelihood of a bingeing 
 30culture, which would offset the welfare gains from less total alcohol consumption. 
Although our model is aimed at explaining a social norm dichotomy in Europe, 
this dichotomy also exists to some extent in the USA. We are therefore less 
certain about the positive effects of increases in alcohol taxes espoused by a large 
number of prominent US economists.
22  Although we have every reason to believe 
that high prices helps reducing consumption in areas where EDSS is already 
established as a social norm, our results indicate that higher prices may actually 
trigger EDSS in areas where this is not currently a major problem. Since the role 
of prices is less clear-cut than previously assumed given social norms and 
genetics, additional research to evaluate the effectiveness of alcohol prices/taxes 
as policy tools seems worthwhile. 
                                     
22 A large number of distinguished economists, including 4 Nobel laureates, signed the petition 
“Economists’ Declaration on Federal Alcohol Excise Taxes.” The petition was organised by 
Coalition for the Prevention of Alcohol Problems and is available at 
http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/letter-alcohol.pdf. 
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 35Appendix. Survey of relationship between eye color and alcohol 
consumption in social situations 
A survey was conducted in two different Economics classes in the spring 2006. 
Students were asked only to respond in their grandparents were of European 
ancestry. In addition the questions were phrased in Norwegian in classes with 
lectures in Norwegian. Given these precautions, and also that we inspected the 
respondents when collecting the responses makes us confident that our sample is 
homogenous group representative of Norwegian young adults with an interest in 
economics. A total of 198 students were asked about their use of alcohol in social 
situations. Of these three students answered that they do not drink alcohol in 
social situations and two reported eye colors that were not easily put into any 
categories. These 5 responses were removed from the survey. In addition to sex, 
and age, the following questions were asked: 
 
On a scale of 0 to 6 indicate how much you agree with the following statements.  
1. I drink alcohol to feel more comfortable in social situations and/or have done 
so in the past. 
I do not agree    0–––1–––2–––3–––4–––5–––6   I agree 
 
2. In a given social situation I adjust my alcohol consumption to match how 
other people are behaving. 
I do not agree    0–––1–––2–––3–––4–––5–––6   I agree 
 
After the students had completed these questions they were asked the following 
question about their eye color.  
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3. What is your eye color?  Please circle:   Blue    Not Blue.   If not blue please 
specify_______  
 
It should be noted that this final question was only known to the students after 
they had answered the other questions as we did not want the answers affected 
by the eye color question. 
Of the 193 used answers 127 reported blue eyes, 27 reported brown eyes and 39 
reported various shades of green. The large fraction of respondents that reported 
various shades of green represented represents a challenge as they need to be 
categorized. Unfortunately, the genetics of eye color (and presumably shyness) is 
still not well understood except that the old textbook description of a single gene 
with two alleles is too simple. However, alleles for brown eyes dominate both 
green and blue. Further, blue eyed individuals and green eyed individuals are in 
general the most genetically similar. Therefore we perform two tests. One test 
where blue eyed individuals and individuals with shades of green are lumped 
together and one where individuals with green eyes are removed from the sample. 
The results are summarized in Table 1 and 2. The statistical test is a standard t-
test assuming non equal variances.  
 
Table 1. Survey responses. Blue eyed and brown eyed individuals only 
  Question 4  Question 4  Question 5  Question 5 
 Browns  Blues  Browns  Blues 
Mean 2  2.602362  2.444444  3.275591 
Variance 2.692308  2.937852  2.333333  3.300431 
Observations 27  127  27  127 
t statistic for 
difference in 
means -1.7186   -2.47902   
 
 37Table 2. Survey responses. The category “Others” include individuals with 
green and blue eyes 
  Question 4  Question 4  Question 5  Question 5 
 Browns  Others  Browns  Others 
Mean response  2  2.644578  2.444444  3.376506 
Variance 2.692308  2.882001  2.333333  3.225566 
Observations 27  166  27  166 
t statistic for 
difference in 
means -1.88383   -2.86482   
 
In both treatments, the difference in means is significant at the (one sided) 5% 
level for Question 4 and (one sided) 0.5% level for Question 5. The inclusion of 
green eyed individuals in the blue eyed category had negligible effect on the mean 
and variance.  
With respect to Question 4, our simple statistical test appears to support the 
premise that blue eyed individuals are more likely to use alcohol as self-
medication.  At least they are more willing to report that they do and we see no 
plausible alternative explanation to the reported differences. With respect to 
Question 5, the question was included in order to justify the assumption made in 
the main text that alcohol consumption in social situations is affected by 
preferences for conformity. The difference in means surprised us. However, a 
stated preference for conformity may be interpreted as a symptom of shyness. As 
such the difference in means in Question 5 may even be a better measure of the 
shyness effect as it reveals the effect of shyness/eye color on consumption without 
the respondent having to admit to using alcohol as a relaxant in social situations. 
Note the ranking scale used in this survey is ordinal, so that we can not make 
statements about the strength of the measured effects nor the magnitude in 
differences. However, the data clearly indicates a systematic difference between 
brown eyed individuals and the others. 
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